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1. Introduction* 
 
As indicated by the title, the book under review offers an explanation as to what 
linguistic change is, and what its causes, mechanisms and consequences are. The 
author amply fulfils its purpose of developing an updated introduction. Written in 
an informative tone and with little formal apparatus, this book is accessible both for 
beginners, advanced students and researchers with different backgrounds. In order 
to illustrate the discussion, Mendívil consistently resorts to the contrast between 
functionalism and generativism, as well as making brilliant parallelisms with the 
evolutionary theory. In this respect, the main idea is that the structure of the 
evolutive process that languages and species follow is the same. This allows us to 
avoid some important misunderstandings, like the confusion between evolution of 
language as a human faculty and the (notion of) linguistic change, with language 
being understood as a cultural object. It is crucial to always bear in mind that by 
“linguistic change” we mean a historical process, rather than the emergence of the 
Language Faculty in modern human beings.  
Instead of reviewing the book by chapters, I preferred to structure this 
review in four sections, which correspond to the four main issues raised by the 
author: what the language change is, why, how and for what. Although I will not 
make it explicit in every case, virtually all the ideas in the following paragraphs 
belong to Mendívil (2015) and references therein; I have just added a few remarks 
which are my own (in this sense, all possible shortcomings are mine). 
 
 
																																																								
* I am very grateful to Francesc Roca for proof-reading this text and for his 
suggestions. All shortcomings are mine. This work has been supported by the 
Generalitat de Catalunya through a FI-fellowship (FI-DGR 2015, 
ECO/1788/2014), and by the Universitat de Girona (Departament de Filologia i 
Comunicació). 
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2. What: tinguistic change 
 
First, we should clarify what is meant by “language”. Mendívil (2015) starts from 
assumptions of the generative grammar and he argues that languages only exist as 
natural objects in the form of brain states of individuals whose development is 
constrained by biological factors and natural laws from its very initial state. 
Although this has been traditionally called Universal Grammar, we are no longer 
assuming that what channels development toward certain stats and no others is 
necessarily linguistic. Along these lines, the author overcomes some criticisms to 
the generative enterprise, such as an excess of specificity or modularity. For 
instance, it is argued that Minimalism and Biolinguistics seek explanations for the 
structure in general principles and in complementary and non-specific cognitive 
systems.  
This view of language is contrasted with that of functionalism, where 
ontological primacy is given to the External-Language (E-language henceforth, 
Chomsky 1986) conceived as a cultural construct and, consequently, it becomes 
usual to place constraints on something external and fuzzy, like culture or rules. 
Besides, the strong bias to adaptationism, especially to a simplified environment, 
leaves the structural uniformity of languages without explanation. 
Following the generative view, Mendívil presumes a cognitive architecture 
where the language of thought presents an imperfect connection with the 
communication systems. What is permeable to experience and variation is this 
interface. Moreover, the null hypothesis is assumed, i.e., the idea that lexical items 
are the unique elements acquired to externalize language. 
Given such an internal conception of languages, the language organ 
developed in every individual is the only real entity in a way similar to the 
conception that only organisms exist in the animal world. Over these natural 
objects, we abstract groups that come to be become E-languages and species. 
Instead, functionalism, more platonic, gives ontological priority to this sort of 
groups of objects. While we create criteria for defining membership (fertile 
reproduction and mutual intelligibility), the author notes that the boundaries are 
actually arbitrary and diffuse, so the groups that functionalism prefers are unreal. 
Consequently, if there are only discrete objects, linguistic change is just an 
abstract historical process that arises when these different objects are linked in a 
temporal sequence. Therefore, the process is not biological, but historical. Indeed, 
there are differences between natural objects from a comparative perspective. 
However, both evolution and the history of linguistic change are restricted to link in 
a time continuum the independent links that correspond to natural objects. 
Conceived this way, languages do not change. Platonic entities that gradually 
change and from which nature continuously extract copies do not exist.  
 
 
3. Why: the causes 
 
The author develops the idea that evolution and linguistic change are natural 
history. For the analogy to be effective, we need to be very precise in the terms of 
the comparison. The parallelism is built on the idea that life and language are 
emergent phenomena that are manifested individually in organisms and in Internal-
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languages (I-languages henceforth). Both organisms and I-languages are the natural 
objects wherein, during development or acquisition, changes happen in (synchronic 
and diachronic) relationship to other natural objects. Because of this, Mendívil calls 
them “historically modified natural objects [translation JR]”; we can make groups 
out of them (E-languages and species), but this is based on arbitrary criteria.  
The changes that these objects undergo are independent from the question 
of which ones are going to persist (by natural selection or social prestige in different 
environments) and from the function they could have. Relative to the organisms, the 
mechanism of change is genetic mutation, whereas with regard to I-languages, it is 
reanalysis. These mutations are produced within a context that replicates and limits 
them: both the DNA and the Universal Grammar can be considered a universal 
code that the objects share, and that at the same time restricts and enables the 
(different) expression of phenotypes. 
One of the defining features of variation is that it does not always occur in 
an isolated manner, but can have multiple consequences at the system level. On the 
one hand, mutations in regulatory genes can significantly affect the expression of 
other genes and the final phenotype; on the other hand, in linguistics we call 
parameters to certain values or changes that have an effect on the behaviour of the 
system. Following Mendívil’s assumption that the locus of the parameters is the 
lexicon, the genome and the lexical interface would be formed when these basic 
elements that have been historically accumulated are grouped. 
Thus, the processes of natural evolution and linguistic evolution are 
formally identical, in spite of the fact that they are evidently applied to different 
substances. In this sense, when we talk about linguistic change we are excluding the 
evolution of the Faculty of Language. The rise of this faculty would be due to a 
minimal genetic change that produced a cognitive leap 100,000 years ago. Saying 
truisms, a linguistic change does not need a genetic change, but it does need a 
linguistic reanalysis; on the contrary, a reconfiguration of our cognitive architecture 
(beyond the possibilities of neural plasticity) does need a genetic change, but it does 
not depend on any reanalysis. Furthermore, reanalysis cannot lead to the evolution 
of our cognitive faculties.  
The Grammaticalization Theory coincides with Functionalism in that both 
consider that the evolution of language is due to an increase of complexity coming 
from the accumulation of linguistic changes. These two approaches make the 
mistake of directly translating what happens with natural objects to what happens 
with cultural objects. In addition, they make simplifications such as the following 
ones: natural objects change to better adapt to the environment, the environment has 
a very simple constitution, and adaptation to the environment suffices to explain 
form.  
The idea that the species or a language literally adapt to the environment 
creating better structures is persistent in the theories of evolution. However, as 
Mendívil points out, Darwin made it clear that evolution does not mean 
improvement, but only a major transmission of some variants over others. Simply, 
certain forms have more possibilities to be perpetuated in a particular environment. 
The change is accidental, i.e., it is not motivated by the cause of its ulterior 
selection.  
Consequently, we cannot find any objective or purpose in the change. Ideal 
designs that fit perf
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correspondence form-environment was so direct, and, importantly, if this 
environment was so simple as culture, there would exist a strong relationship 
between languages and cultures, a fact that is contradicted by their uniformity.  
Another mistake is to simplify the environment to which languages are 
thought to adapt ignoring most of the natural conditions. For instance, functionalism 
considers the speaker as a crucial factor in the adaptive environment. It is usual to 
consider that she improves the language thanks to intuitions about communicative 
efficiency, the capacity to compare present and undeveloped states of language and 
to choose between them, etc. In addition to these false statements, this view will 
lead us to conclude that there exist inferior or more primitive previous stages, a 
conclusion that we would not accept for natural organisms.  
According to Mendívil, the most relevant factors in the environment of 
languages are neither cultural nor something of the sort. Instead, he points to the 
much more immediate cognitive, biological and natural structure within which they 
are inserted. Nature channels the development of each language much more 
strongly than any other factor. Therefore, the adaptation to a communicative 
environment does not suffice to explain the form of the objects. The uniform 
patterns that we find in languages and in organisms owe their origin to something 
much deeper and universal. For instance, Ramírez (2015) proposes that locality 
constraints in linguistic structures are due to locality effects in oscillatory brain 
structures. The tendency to homogenize and create ambiguities in both structures 
could be ultimately related to the universal tendency to equilibrium, a 
thermodynamics law. 
Then, if we want to identify an ultimate cause of variation, we have to point 
just to the different, accidental and minimal solutions that nature permits to some 
problems. There is no invisible hand, no superior will nor any destiny of 
enhancement guiding the process. According to Mendívil, the problem we face is 
externalization. Due to its imperfect connection with language, a lot of information 
gets lost when hierarchy, structure and semantics are converted into a stream of 
sounds. The linguistic output we generate by means of lexical items is ambiguous, 
and learners must reproduce the invisible connections between them and the 
structures of thought. Disarrangements are, then, expected.  
 
 
4. How: the mechanisms 
 
Languages and organisms are reproduced imperfectly. In organisms, genetic 
mutations happen and cause inheritable variation in phenotypes subject to selection. 
Likewise, in acquisition, linguistic reanalyses are produced. They consist of 
readjustments in the way in which the uniform structure of thought is externalized. 
The ambiguity of the input would be due to the imperfect connection between some 
systems. Mendívil claims that every linguistic change takes place by the same 
mechanism of reanalysis. Nevertheless, these readjustments are limited by natural 
factors: the cognitive architecture of language restricts the scope of reanalysis to the 
interface where lexical items operate; the underlying syntax would be universal.  
The reanalysis process would include the notion of “grammaticalization”. In 
a sense amenable to generativism, grammaticalization is conceived as a process 
where representations of a lexical nature lose some of their values and materialize 
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categories of a functional nature. In contrast, the Grammaticalization Theory 
conceives it as a creative process that is progressively producing new categories for 
languages. This way, language gradually becomes more complex or more 
grammatical. The major problem with this view is the erroneous association 
between the rise of a lexical exponent and the rise, at a cognitive level, of the 
mental construct that it externalizes. It would not make any sense to believe that 
externalization precedes thought. Hence, Mendívil’s line of thought seems more 
reasonable: he claims that categories are part of a universal inventory of our 
species; there is no cultural process that can alter them. 
The hypothesis of variation restricted to externalization is challenged by the 
apparent syntactic variation among languages. With a naked eye, the structure of 
sentences varies, that is, syntactic constituents are differently ordered in different 
languages. With the aim to reduce syntactic variation to morphology, Mendívil 
assumes a universal sentence structure and a very concrete implementation of the 
parametric theory. He defends that there are hierarchically organized values and 
that these values have consequences at a system-level, show some correlations 
among them and condition each other. Their effects are formalized as sets of 
morphological properties. Mendívil goes over a reformulation of the parametric 
theory à la Borer-Chomsky, which prevents them from the illogic parameterization 
of principles. Furthermore, and he resorts to the virical conception of features, 
which became popular in the Minimalist Program, to justify order changes in terms 
of checking of features through syntactic movement.  
 
 
5. For what: the consequences 
 
The only consequence of linguistic change is the diversity of languages in itself, 
which is a very limited one. Given such a poor outcome, Mendívil puts emphasis on 
which consequences are not possible: linguistic change cannot produce anything 
that is not language, nor can it create it; linguistic change cannot modify our 
biology.  
In support to the universality defined mostly by natural factors, we could 
adduce the hypothesis of uniformity of languages, according to which every 
language is in the same evolutionary stage. Importantly, this is not because 
languages had enough time to reach a pinnacle of complexity; it has to do with 
biological constraints over the language organ.  
In the same vein, the changes in the way we think are not a consequence of 
linguistic change, contrary to the what linguistic relativism claimed. Radical 
empiricists think that language modulates thought, grounded on incorrect premises 
such as that language and thought are distinct entities and that languages influence 
our world conception, and not viceversa. Unfruitful attempts to corroborate this 
have been limited to superficial properties of language.  
For linguists’ relief, a lower order consequence could be that cognitive 
science can study language from different perspectives. Mendívil feels optimistic 
about the idea that a proper parametric theory will help to delimitate where the 
universality is and where variation is.  
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6. Assessment  
 
This book surpasses the introductory character announced by its author. It goes 
deeper than many other publications on linguistic change intended for audiences 
with a background in formal linguistics. This is so because, in general, books that 
approach this topic assume as certain a large amount of postulations and move to 
tackle very specific questions in the form of more and more features that describe 
more and more data.  
As a matter of fact, the book precisely deflates when it leaves the reflexive 
tone behind and dedicates chapters to the mechanisms of linguistic change, 
specially the syntactic one. The proposals of the book are courageous, but a further 
degree of bravery is needed to refuse the usual formal (un)explanation. I talk about 
bravery because this gap cannot be attributed to the author, but, probably, to the 
main goals of the collection. His vast knowledge of biology could be much more 
productive. 
If one of the conclusions reached is that linguistic change is just an 
abstraction drawn over accidents without deep causes or consequences, why would 
we need such a formal apparatus to capture it? It may be time to focus on biological 
and universal factors that constrain change, nothing else. It is often said that 
parametric theory might be useful for cognitive (neuro)science. Considering the 
explicative simplicity of the proposals about mechanisms by cognitive 
neuroscience, and the difficulties to find out correlates of linguistic operations in 
neuroscience, I truly doubt it.  
But there is a much more serious error that linguists have lost sight of. We 
endlessly believe that we understand the universal component of language, which 
legitimates us to focus the research on variation. In the eighties, we supposedly 
apprehended the principles of language, so we jumped to analyze variation in the 
form of macroparameters. In the nineties, we realized that we did not understand the 
principles: we postulated some minimal and general ones, and jumped into 
microvariation. This century, biolinguistics is sending the same warning sign again: 
we have not understood the principles yet, so it is still premature to approach a 
variation whose limits we don’t know.  
For instance, an important premise assumed in this book is the perfect 
connection between the computational system and the conceptual-intentional 
system, in contrast to the imperfect connection between the former and the 
sensorio-motor system. It suffices to have a look at any introductory book on 
cognitive neuroscience to realize that, although we have some ideas about how 
information is processed in the sensory and motor systems, the so-called 
conceptual-intentional system is nowhere! 
This does not mean that translating the supposed architecture of language to 
the brain is impossible. I tried myself and I could speculate, but, at this very 
moment, we just have some knowledge about the sensory-motor systems, and the 
conceptual-intentional system is only a wildcard expression for the linguist. Then, 
we cannot assume that some connections are perfect and that some others are not; in 
consequence, it is difficult to construct a whole theory over such weak 
fundamentals.  
The latter is not a reproof to the author nor to this book, but to the field in 
general. If our aim is to understand the biological constraints of variation, we may 
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need to go back to the pre-parametric era, to the most elementary ideas of 
generativism. Only when we can understand the most basic operations (Ramírez 
2014, Ramírez et al. 2015) and the most basic constraints (Ramírez 2015), will we 
feel more legitimized to enter the scope of variation. If our aim is to talk about the 
mind and the brain at the same time, I have very little hope that the formal tools we 
use today will hold up.  
Finallly, and in a somewhat rough summary, we can say that languages do 
not change and that the historical process we abstract lacks deep causes and 
consequences. This is so simply because imperfect replications of ambiguous input 
occur accidentally among individuals and such a replication among peers would 
take place over the externalization of (language of) thought. As a result, we get 
diversity from a comparative perspective; no more, no less. 
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